HOW TO CONQUER TERRORISM

In today’s world of think tanks as front groups for political propaganda, the first thought that always comes to mind when faced with a paper touted as research into the effects of military action on terrorism is that it is probably packed with circumstantial arguments for a preconceived notion. At least that was my reaction when I began reading a paper titled, “How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaida”, and published by the Rand Corporation.

My first step was to take a look at the Rand website and find out who sits on the board of directors. As I suspected, it would be quite reasonable to assume from that list that the focus of the organization would be quite conservative. Sure their mission statement touts their interest in objective research, but FOX news says their reporting is fair and balanced, too!

On reading the paper, though, I was forced to conclude that this might well be an objective view. Of course, I may be prejudiced in that I liked the paper because it agreed with the opinions I held before it was written, but while that might make the paper suspect if I had written it, I assume that the researchers for Rand undertook the task from a different perspective. It was presented to Congress on July 29, and you can see the entire report at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9351/index1.html.

The paper, as its title explicitly states, asked what kinds of actions impacted terrorist groups most heavily with an eye toward developing effective responses that would reduce the danger we face from terrorism. At worst, just asking the question beat the hell out of trotting out the troops, planes and bombs to find out if they would do the job. Of course, we already knew that doesn’t work from our experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. (That is most of us knew. There still those incredibly hard heads who seem unable to accept it and would continue to keep our children at risk on nebulous front lines in those regions in spite of the myriad of facts that prove the notion that this somehow protects us to be nonsense.)

Well, maybe if those folks would read this paper, they would finally get it, too. The authors, Seth G. Jones and Maring C. Libicki had no political ax to grind. All they had was a question to answer: “How do terrorist groups end?” In seeking the answer, they examined 648 terrorist groups that existed between 1968 and 2006.

So what was the answer? The most common demise of these groups (43% of them) ended by being transition into legitimate political groups. They found that the narrower the group’s goals were, the more likely it was for them to achieve their goals without violence. That enables the government to negotiate a settlement of some sort.

If terrorist groups can’t accept non-violent solutions, police action is the most effective way to cope with them. That means intelligence, penetration and disruption. They also found that local police, rather than federal police, were the most effective.

About 10% of terrorist groups disbanded because they met their goals. So how does military action stack up? About 7% of terrorist groups were stopped by the military. The military, not surprisingly, works best against large, identifiable groups involved in insurgencies. The problem, also not surprisingly, is that military methods tend to kill a lot of innocent people, and that causes a backlash that creates more terrorism. Hmmm. Does that have a familiar ring to you? Takes me back to the question I asked before we invaded Iraq – Who will be the next terrorist, the father whose son we feed or the son whose father we kill?

Again not surprisingly, the hardest groups to destroy are those motivated by religion. Of the groups they studied, Jones and Libicki say that 62% have ended, but only 32% of those that were motivated by religion have ended. At the same time, the religious groups are the ones least likely to achieve their goals.

Ultimately, the most useful aspect of this study is its implications for our approach to dealing with Al Qaida. Their first point was that nothing we have done so far has been very effective. Here is a quote that I hope our Congressfolk picked up on and will give some serious thought to, “Al Qa’ida’s resurgence should trigger a fundamental rethinking of U.S. counterterrorism strategy.”

Here are their recommendations for action:
1. “Policing and intelligence should be the backbone of U.S. efforts.”

2. “Military force, though not necessarily U.S. soldiers, may be a necessary instrument when al Qa’ida is involved in an insurgency. (Emphasis mine.)
This means a light U.S. military footprint or none at all . . . its presence is likely to increase terrorist recruitment.”

3. Replace the “war on terror” with “counterterrorism”. (The concept of war elevates the terrorists’ position.)

Their final conclusion, “Our analysis concludes that al Qa’ida’s probability of success in actually overthrowing any government is close to zero” should, though it certainly won’t, release the U.S. from the grip of its paranoia.

Once again FDR was right—We have nothing to fear but fear itself.

All the presidential candidates keep talking about change, but most of it is hot air. When will one of them talk about meaningful change in our approach to dealing with terrorism?

When I hear a politician striving to calm our fears instead of trying to stir them up, I’ll know that he/she is truly deserving of my vote.

“Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty or give me death!” – Patrick Henry


Be the change you wish to see in the world. -- M. K. Gandhi

The reason for going was to keep the crude flowing and raise a false flag abroad. – from a poem by Jack Evans titled 3500 Souls - http://www.myspace.com/paralegal_eagle

Individually we have little voice. Collectively we cannot be ignored.
But in silence we surrender our power. Yours in Peace -- BR